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WHEN DIFFERENT MEANS THE SAME:
APPLYING A DIFFERENT STANDARD OF
PROOF TO WHITE PLAINTIFFS UNDER THE
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS PRIMA FAcIE
CASE TEST
Angela Onwuachi-Willigt
INTRODUCTION
The idea that Whites,' in particular white males, are the new vic-
tims of discrimination is steadily gaining acceptance among white
Americans.2 While only 16 percent of white individuals claim to
t Associate, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue. Former law clerk, the Honorable Solomon
Oliver, Jr., United States District Judge for the Northern District of Ohio. J.D., University of
Michigan, 1997; B.A., Grinnell College, 1994. For comments and discussion on an earlier draft,
I am grateful to Christopher Burke, Devon Carbado, Alex Romain, Steve Sandquist, and Jacob
Wilig-Onwuachi. I would also like to acknowledge Chris O'Connor and Matt Albers for their
assistance in editing this piece.
1 This author uses the term "Whites" throughout this Article to refer to members of the
majority race and uses the term "Blacks" to refer to members of the black race. This author
prefers the term "Blacks" to the term "African Americans" because she believes that the term
"Blacks" is more inclusive. This Article addresses race discrimination in employment, and this
author recognizes that there are persons living in the United States who have "black" skin but
who are not Americans and may experience similar forms of race discrimination in employ-
ment, i.e., permanent residents. Additionally, this author finds that the term "Blacks" is better
suited to contrast the term "Whites." "It is more convenient to invoke the terminological differ-
entiation between black and white than say, between African-American and Northern European-
American, which would be necessary to maintain semantic symmetry between the two typolo-
gies." Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Defending the Use of Quotas in Affirmative Action: Attacking Ra-
cism in the Nineties, 1992 U. ILL L REv. 1043, 1073 (1992).
2 See Ronald Walters, Affirmative Action and the Politics of Concept Appropriation, 38
How. L.J. 587, 604 (1995) (noting that opponents of affirmative action have claimed that "some
white males suffer a disadvantage from the implementation of affirmative action laws to such a
degree that they have become a new 'oppressed class'); Carol R. Goforth, 'What Is She?' How
Race Matters and Why It Shouldn't, 46 DEPAUL L. REv. 1, 75 (1996) (noting that the perception
that white males have been denied equal opportunities because of their race or gender "has
become a cause celebre for conservative legal commentators and politicians"); C.E. "Chuck"
Williams, Affirmative Action Doesn't Involve Quotas/Initiative 200 - Preference or Prejudice,
THE COLUMBIAN, Nov. 1, 1998, at B 11 (same); see also Joyce A. Hughes, "Reverse Discrimi-
nation" and Higher Education Faculty, 3 MICH. J. RACE & L. 395 (1998) (noting the same
trends among white academics).
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know someone who has been the victim of reverse discrimination,
3
more than 70 percent of Whites are convinced that reverse discrimi-
nation is a rampant problem.4  Additionally, although reverse dis-
crimination cases generally constitute a small percentage of filed dis-
crimination cases, usually about 1 to 3 percent,5 that number is begin-
ning to grow.6 In particular, the percentage of reverse discrimination
claims brought by federal workers, the very workers for whom af-
firmative action has been the most successful, 7 has increased signifi-
cantly. 8 For example, the number of reverse discrimination charges
brought by white federal employees has almost doubled, rising from
just 10 percent of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's
("EEOC") caseload in 1991 to 17.1 percent in 1996.9
As more Whites bring reverse discrimination cases, federal
courts are increasingly confronted with the question of how to evalu-
ate these cases under current discrimination law. The current frame-
work for evaluating discrimination claims was set forth by the Su-
preme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.10 Under the
3 In this article, "reverse discrimination" is defined as discrimination against persons
belonging to groups that have traditionally been privileged by their race and/or sex in the United
States.
4 See Williams, supra note 2, at Bll. See generally Anne Laurent, The Great Divide,
GOVERNMENT ExEcuTIv, April 1, 1996 (discussing the growing perception among Whites that
they are wrongfully denied positions or promotions because of their race).
5 See David Hall, Reflections on Affirmative Action: Halcyon Winds and Minefields, 31
NEw ENG. L. REv. 941, 956 (1997); Williams, supra note 2, at B 11 ("A U.S. Department of
Labor report prepared by Rutgers Blumrosen found fewer than 100 cases of claimed anti-white
discrimination among 3,000 cases processed by federal district and appellant [sic] courts be-
tween 1990 and 1994. In only six cases was there a finding of actual reverse discrimination.");
see also Hughes, supra note 2, at 396-97 (stating that few reported cases involve reverse dis-
crimination and that still fewer are judged meritorious).
6 See Ruth Larson, Claims of Bias Rising in Agencies 17% of Complaints Last Year by
Whites, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 17, 1997, at Al; Laurent, supra note 4, at 12.
7 See Laurent, supra note 4, at 12 ("Women and minority men hold bigger percentages of
white-collar jobs in government than in the workforce as a whole. The percentage of women in
professional jobs last year was two and a half times what it was 17 years ago. African-
Americans nearly doubled their presence in these occupations, while Asians and Hispanics
nearly tripled theirs. Minorities nearly doubled their presence in the executive corps and
women's proportion of top slots increased seven times .... ).
8 See Laurent, supra note 4, at 12 (discussing the increased instances of reverse discrimi-
nation cases lodged under Title VI).
9 See Larson, supra note 6, at Al; Laurent, supra note 4, at 14 ("After remaining steady
since the late 1980s, [the] number [of reverse discrimination cases] has started to grow. Sex
bias complaints filed by men averaged about a third of the total between 1988 and 1993 and race
complaints by whites hovered around 20 percent of the total. Those numbers bounced in 1994,
the year of the 'angry white male' political revolution. Men's complaints of sex bias jumped to
nearly half of all sex discrimination claims. Race discrimination filings by whites climbed to 30
percent of the total.").
t0 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In McDonnell Douglas, the defendant McDonnell Douglas Cor-
poration, fired the plaintiff, Percy Green, a black male, in an attempt to reduce its workforce. In
response to this action, Green participated in illegal protests against McDonnell Douglas,
claiming that his discharge and the company's general hiring practices were racially motivated.
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McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff establishes a prima facie
case of race discrimination in employment by proving the following
four factors: (1) that he belongs to a minority group; (2) that he ap-
plied for and was qualified for the position at issue; (3) that despite
his qualifications, he was rejected; and (4) that after his rejection, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applica-
tions from persons of his qualifications. u If the plaintiff establishes
these factors, the court draws an inference of discrimination.'2 The
burden then shifts to the employer, who must provide a legitimate
explanation for rejecting the plaintiff's application. 13 If the employer
satisfies this burden, the plaintiff must show that the employer's rea-
son is a pretext for discrimination to win his case. la
If strictly applied, the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case test
("McDonnell Douglas test") would eliminate all reverse race dis-
Approximately three weeks later, McDonnell Douglas sought a replacement for Green's posi-
tion, and although Green re-applied for his former position, the company rejected his applica-
tion. Id. at 794-96. Green then filed a formal complaint against McDonnell Douglas, claiming
that the company refused to hire him because of his race and his involvement in the civil rights
movement. See id. at 797. Upon reviewing the lower courts' decisions, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision, finding for McDonnell Douglas on Green's protected
activity claim. The Eighth Circuit found that Green's unlawful protests against McDonnell
Douglas were not protected activities as defined in Section 704(a) of Title VIL See id. at 803.
The Court also affirmed the Eighth Circuit's decision to remand Green's racial discrimination
claim for trial. In so doing, the Court acknowledged the difficulties that plaintiffs have in
showing direct proof of race discrimination and created a framework in which plaintiffs could
use indirect evidence to prove discrimination based on race. See id. at 803-06.
" See id. at 802.
12 Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) ('he prima
facie case serves an important function in the litigation: it eliminates the most common nondis-
criminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection.").
"' See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54 (noting that the burden on the defendant is only a
burden of production, not a burden of proof).
14 See id. at 256 ("The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion... [tihis burden now
merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of inten-
tional discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a
discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."); see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v.
Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). In Hicks, the Supreme Court explained that even where the plain-
tiff proves that the employer's proffered reason is false, the court is not required to find that
discrimination has occurred. The fact finder may still find for the employer if he believes that
the employer's actions were not motivated by race. See id. The decision in Hicks has been
heavily criticized by academics and practitioners. See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of
Circumstantial Proof in Employment Discrimination Litigation: St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks, Pretext, and the "Personality" Excuse, 18 BERKELEY J. EmP. & LAB. L. 184, 184 (1997)
(arguing that the Hicks decision "will distort the fact-finding process and deprive victims of bias
of a meaningful opportunity to enforce their rights to equal employment opportunity"); Deborah
A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning The Basic Assumption, 26 CoNN.
L REv. 997 (1994) (asserting that the Hicks decision was based on the erroneous belief that
discrimination is either diminishing or eradicated and that such belief will unduly burden plain-
tiffs who are seeking redress under Title VII); Sherrie L. Coons, Comment, Proving Disparate
Treatment After St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Is Anything Left of McDonnell Douglas, 19
J. CoRp. L. 379 (1994) (arguing that Hicks will have dire practical consequences for employees
who suffer illegal discrimination but have no direct evidence of discrimination).
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crimination suits because a white individual could never prove the
first factor of the test, that he was a member of a minority group.15
However, as the McDonnell Douglas Court noted, the standards set
forth in McDonnell Douglas are "not necessarily applicable in every
respect in differing factual situations." 16  Consequently, some courts
have modified the first element of the McDonnell Douglas test to ac-
commodate white individuals who bring reverse discrimination
suits.' 7 These courts, however, disagree as to how to modify the first
prong of the McDonnell Douglas test in reverse discrimination cases.
Some courts have modified the test to hold white plaintiffs to a
different standard under the test's first prong.18 To satisfy the test's
first prong before these courts, white plaintiffs must show background
circumstances that suggest that their employer, "is that unusual em-
ployer who discriminates against the majority." 19 To accomplish this
task, white plaintiffs can use one of two different methods. They can
either (1) show that their "particular employer has some reason or
inclination to discriminate invidiously against them;" or (2) demon-
strate that the background circumstances particular to their employ-
ment situation indicate a discriminatory purpose.20  For example, a
15 See Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450,454 (7th Cir. 1999).
16 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
17 Courts have also modified the first element of the test for other groups. For example, in
sex discrimination cases, a female claimant need only state that she is a woman rather than a
member of a minority group. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254 n.6.
18 See, e.g., Mills, 171 F.3d at 456-57 (applying a different first prong of the McDonnell
Douglas test to non-minority plaintiffs); Taken v. Okla. Corp. Comm'n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1369
(10th Cir. 1997) (same); Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 152-53 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (same); Murray
v. Thistledown Racing Club, 770 F.2d 67 (6th Cir. 1985) (same).
The Tenth Circuit has also provided an alternative for white plaintiffs to state a prima
facie case of discrimination in Notari v. Denver Water Dept., 971 F.2d 585, 589 (10th Cir.
1992) (holding that a majority candidate may state a prima facie case of discrimination if he
presents direct evidence of discrimination or indirect evidence sufficient to support a reasonable
probability that, but for the plaintiffs majority status, the challenged employment decision
would have favored the plaintiff). See generally Brenda D. Luigi, Note, The Notari Alternative:
A Better Approach to the Square-Peg-Round-Hole Problem Found in Reverse Discrimination
Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REv. 353 (1998) (discussing the significance and impact of the Notari
decision on the Title VII reverse discrimination landscape); Bridget E. McKeever, Case Note,
Tenth Circuit Provides Alternative For Majority Plaintiffs to State a Prima Facie Case Under
Title VII: Notari v. Denver Water Department, 34 B.C.L. REv. 440 (1993) (same).
19 Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981). In Parker,
the plaintiff, a white male, claimed that he was denied a promotion because of his race and sex.
Id. at 1014.
20 Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that the plaintiffs had shown
the existence of "background circumstances" by presenting evidence of schemes to fix perform-
ance ratings to their detriment, that the hiring system seemed rigged against them because it
departed from usual procedures in an unprecedented fashion, and that they were passed over
despite superior qualifications) (citations omitted); see also Duffy v. Wolle, 123 F.3d 1026,
1036-37 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1839 (1998) (applying a variant of the McDon-
nell Douglas test in a reverse discrimination case and holding that "background circumstances"
could include situations in which the person ultimately hired was clearly less qualified than the
[Vol. 50:53
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white plaintiff might satisfy the test's first prong by showing that he
is a racial minority within his company or that a minority of his com-
pany's managers are White.
21
While some courts choose to apply a different first prong to
white plaintiffs under the test, other courts choose to apply the same
first prong to white and black plaintiffs under the test. These courts
view Title VII as requiring the application of the same test factors for
all claims of employment discrimination and merely require white
claimants to show that they are a member of a protected class.2 " In
other words, these courts require plaintiffs to simply show that they
are a member of any race.
This Article argues that courts should apply a different first
prong of the McDonnell Douglas test to white plaintiffs in reverse
discrimination cases. More specifically, this Article argues that
courts should apply the "background circumstances" test to race dis-
crimination claims brought by white employees. 23 This is important
because such application best adheres to the primary purpose of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII") 24 and the Supreme Court's
treatment of the McDonnell Douglas test 2 Part I of this Article ex-
plaintiff, the hiring authority expressed intense interest in hiring a woman, and there was a pat-
tern of hiring women in the past).
21 See Reynolds v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 69 F.3d 1523, 1534-35 (10th Cir.
1995) (finding that the plaintiff successfully showed background circumstances where she was
the only white employee in the department and nearly all of the decision makers were Hispanic);
Parker, 652 F.2d at 1017 (holding that background circumstances were present where a majority
of the employees were black and "an overwhelmingly large proportion of the promotions" were
of Blacks) (citations omitted); Switzer v. Tex. Commerce Bank, 850 F. Supp. 544, 548 (N.D.
Tex. 1994) (holding that no background circumstances were present where the plaintiff failed to
show that Whites were a minority of his company's managers).
2 See Wilson v. Bailey, 934 F.2d 301, 304 (11th Cir. 1991) (requiring non-minority
plaintiffs only to show that they are members of a protected class); Young v. City of Houston,
906 F.2d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 1990) (same).
Other circuits have refused to address this issue altogether but have indicated that they
would require white claimants merely to state that they are White. See, e.g., Stock v. Universal
Foods Corp., No. 93-1448, 1994 WL 10682, at *2 n.2 (4th Cir. Jan. 19, 1994), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 813 (1994) (deciding not to resolve the issue because the plaintiff could not satisfy all of
the remaining three factors of the prima facie case); Hannon v. Chater, 887 F. Supp. 1303, 1312
n.41 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (same).
2 This Article limits its arguments to those race discrimination cases brought by white
claimants against white employers, as this author finds that cases involving claims brought by
white claimants against minority employers are the "easy" cases. These cases would invariably
constitute unusual background circumstances under the McDonnell Douglas "background cir-
cumstances" test. See supra text accompanying note 21.
24 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
2 Additionally, in making its arguments, this Article solely discusses and compares the
employment situations of Whites and Blacks. Because Blacks have been the primary subjects of
employment discrimination studies and audits, most of the studies used to support this Article's
thesis address discrimination against Blacks only. Furthermore, this Article recognizes that,
while many minority groups, i.e. Blacks and Latinos, encounter similar types of race discrimi-
nation in the workplace, they also experience such discrimination in significantly different
1999]
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amines the plain language of Title VII, the statute's legislative his-
tory, and the Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute. In so do-
ing, this Part maintains that, while Title VII is intended to protect all
persons from race discrimination in employment, its primary purpose
is to protect Blacks and members of other racially disadvantaged
groups from such discrimination. Part I also explains the function of
the McDonnell Douglas test. In so doing, this Part argues that the
test's first prong is the most determinative part of the test and, as a
result, should be modified to fit the facts of each case. Part II de-
scribes the current employment situation of Whites as compared to
Blacks, and contends that, given such facts, it is reasonable for courts
to apply a different first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test to
white plaintiffs bringing reverse discrimination cases. Finally, Part
Im details the prospective harm that would be caused by applying the
same McDonnell Douglas test to white plaintiffs. It further addresses
the arguments against applying a different first prong of the McDon-
nell Douglas test to white plaintiffs. The Article concludes that
courts should apply a different first factor of the McDonnell Douglas
test to white plaintiffs in reverse discrimination suits because such
application of the test ensures that Whites and Blacks are treated
equally under the test.
ways. See Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Hierarchy, Asian Americans and Latinos as "Foreigners,"
and Social Change: Is the Law the Way to Go?, 76 OR. L. REv. 347, 359-62 (1997) (describing
how the discrimination against various racial and ethnic groups can differ); Deborah Ramirez,
Multicultural Empowerment: It's Not Just Black and White Anymore, 42 STAN. L. REv. 957,
958-60, 963 (1995) (same); cf. Leonard M. Baynes, If It's Not Just Black and White Anymore,
Why Does Darkness Cast a Longer Discriminatory Shadow Than Lightness? An Investigation
and Analysis of the Color Hierarchy, 75 DENY. U. L. REv. 131 (1997) (asserting that, among
minorities, darker-skinned persons generally face more discrimination than lighter-skinned
persons).
In an attempt to avoid grouping the experiences of all minorities together, this Article
refrains from applying all of its arguments to all minorities. The very premise behind this Arti-
cle is that the application of the test's first prong should be group-specific. For example, in a
case brought by a plaintiff belonging to one minority group against an employer belonging to
another minority group, this Article contends that a court would have to consider whether that
plaintiff was disadvantaged by his race in that particular circumstance to apply the first prong
properly. See Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990) (raising questions
concerning the complexity of situations involving discrimination by one minority against an-
other); see also EEOC v. Consolidated Servs. Sys., 777 F. Supp. 599 (N.D. Ill. 1991), aff'd, 989
F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1992) (same).
This Article is not suggesting that its arguments cannot be applied to cases involving
parties of other races. Many of the arguments are applicable to cases involving other racial
groups, particularly those involving Whites and Latinos. Indeed, because of the lack of studies
concerning race discrimination in employment, this author has also used studies that detail the
experiences of non-black minority groups with employment discrimination to support the Arti-
cle's thesis.
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I. UNDERSTANDING THE PURPOSE OF TITLE VII AND THE
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS PRIMA FACIE TEST
To determine how courts should apply the first prong of the
McDonnell Douglas test to white plaintiffs, one must first examine
the statutory basis for the test, Title VII, as well as the Supreme
Court's treatment of the McDonnell Douglas test. This Part evaluates
the plain language 26 and the legislative history of Title VII and deter-
mines that the statute's primary purpose is to protect Blacks (and
other minorities) from discrimination.27 This Part also evaluates the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the McDonnell Douglas test and
concludes that the knowledge of a plaintiff's race and status in society
or in his workplace are critical to the proper application of the test.
A. Acknowledging the Primary Purpose of Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196428 reads in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer
... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.29
According to the plain language of Title VII, any person can be a
plaintiff in an employment discrimination case. The statute does not
exclude members of the majority or limit the protection of the Act to
one particular racial group or to members of historically disadvan-
taged groups alone.30 Its language allows all individuals to use the
statute to protect themselves from employment discrimination as a
matter of law.
26 See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 857 (1st Cir. 1998) ("The start-
ing point for interpretation of a statute 'is the language of the statute itself."') (quoting Kaiser
Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990)).
2 Given the racial problems between Whites and Blacks at the time of the enactment of
Title VII, the legislative history of Title VII discusses only race discrimination that occurs
against Blacks in the workforce. It is clear, however, that Congress intended to focus on the
protection of all disadvantaged minority groups. See Ramirez, supra note 25, at 958-59 ("When
courts and legislatures first created race-conscious remedies in the 1960s, the United States was
seen as a black and white society... [gliven the relatively small number of nonblack persons of
color, their inclusion in many color-conscious remedies was not problematic at the time."). For
the purposes of this Article, this author argues only that the primary purpose of Title VII is to
protect Blacks.
2' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
29 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1994).
" See e. christi cunningham, The Rise of Identity Politics I: The Myth of the Protected
Class in Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 30 CoNN. L. REV. 441, 446-47 (1998) (reviewing
the legislative history of Title VII).
1999]
60 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWREVIEW [Vol. 50:53
Although specific in many respects, the plain language of Title
VII left some major issues for the courts to resolve. 31 For example,
the statute does not define the phrase "to discriminate... because of
[an] individual's race,, 32 nor does it state whether it would be dis-
crimination under the plain language of Title VII for an employer to
favor minority workers over white employees in order to remedy past
discrimination against a minority group.3 3  Consequently, an exami-
nation of the statute's legislative history is needed to ensure proper
focus on the primary intent and goals of Congress when it passed the
Act.34 In applying any statute, courts must view that statute within its
historical context.35
The legislative history of Title VII reveals that while Congress
intended the statute to protect all persons from employment discrimi-
nation, its primary purpose is to protect Blacks from such discrimina-
tion.36 In enacting Title VII, Congress was particular about the ways
in which Blacks, as compared to Whites, were treated in the work-
place and in the job market. For example, Senator Hubert Humphrey,
one of the Act's sponsors in the Senate, remarked:
The crux of the problem is to open employment opportunities
for Negroes in occupations which have been traditionally
31 See Timothy N. Tack, Comment, The Supreme Court's Review of Voluntary Affirmative
Action by Public Employers: Applying Different Standards Under Title VII and the Constitution,
26 WILLIAMErE L. REV. 957, 960 (1990) (discussing the issues left unresolved by the statutory
language of Title VIl).
32 Id. at 962.
33 See id.
34 See U.S. v. Childress, 104 F.3d 47, 53 (4th Cir. 1996) ("If the language of the statute is
unclear, the court may look to the legislative history for guidance in interpreting the statute.");
cf Joel Win. Friedman, Redefining Equality, Discrimination, and Affirmative Action Under Title
VII: The Access Principle, 65 TEX. L. REV. 41, 42 (1986) ("Although the provisions of Title VII
contain numerous references to the term 'discriminate,' the statute does not define the term...
[and] discrimination, of course, does possess a literal definition. In general usage, discrimina-
tion refers to conduct that makes or is based upon a distinction or differentiation. Such conduct
is unlawful Title VII discrimination, however, only when and because it violates the statutory
conception of equality. Accordingly, equality must be defined in the employment context in
order to determine what actions constitute statutory discrimination").
3S See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) ("It is a 'familiar
rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within the statute, because
not within its spirit nor within the intention of its makers.' The prohibition against racial dis-
crimination in §§ 703(a) and (d) of Title VII must therefore be read against the background of
the legislative history of Title VII and the historical context from which the Act arose."); see
also Tack, supra note 31, at 962; Friedman, supra note 34, at 60-61; c. Arnold v. United Parcel
Serv., 136 F.3d 854, 858 ("The plain meaning of the statute's text must be given effect 'unless it
would produce an absurd result or one manifestly at odds with the statute's intended effect."')
(quoting Parisi by Cooney v. Chater, 69 F.3d 614, 617 (1st Cir. 1995)).
36 See BARBARA R. BERGMANN, IN DEFENSE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 90 (1996) (noting
that Title VII's "primary purpose [is] to end segregation, to usher black people into full partici-
pation in the nation's economic life as employees and customers, and to ensure them the status
of first class citizens"); cunningham, supra note 30, at 446; Ramirez, supra note 25, at 958.
WHEN DIFFERENT MEANS THE SAME
closed to them. This requires both an end to the discrimina-
tion which now prevails and an upgrading of Negro occupa-
tional skills through education and training. Neither task can
be given priority over the other .... Negroes cannot be ex-
pected to train themselves for positions which they know will
be denied to them because of their color. Nor can patterns of
discrimination be effectively broken down until Negroes in
sizable numbers are available for the jobs to be filled. Title
VII is designed to give Negroes ... a fair chance to earn a
livelihood and contribute their talents to the building of a
more prosperous America.37
Similarly, Representative William McCulloch, a leading Republican
supporter of the Bill, noted, "National prosperity will be increased
through the proper training of Negroes for more skilled employment
together with the removal of barriers for obtaining such employ-
ment. ' 38 While the congressional debates extensively discussed the
need to address discrimination against Blacks, they made no mention
of discrimination against Whites, nor did they note such discrimina-
tion as a problem.
In essence, the congressional debates on Title VII show that
Congress' primary concern was with the relegation of Blacks to low-
skill jobs and the manner in which racial discrimination helped to
perpetuate Blacks' low status in employment. The debates further
indicate that Congress enacted Title VII primarily as a means for de-
stroying old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy39 by opening
37 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964). Senator Humphrey was co-floor manager for H.R. 7152,
the omnibus bill that became the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
31 H.R. Res. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 28 (1963). Rep. Dent also remarked:
Denial to the Negro of the right to be gainfully employed shuts off to him the op-
portunity for economic advancement. The right to be served in places of public ac-
commodation is meaningless to the man who has no money. The opportunity for
education in an integrated school or college is lost on a child who knows that, what-
ever his education, he is condemned to a life of unskilled and menial labor punctu-
ated by periods of unemployment. If there is any single point at which the vicious
circle which discrimination has drawn around the Negro must be broken, it is in the
field of employment.
110 CONG. REc. 2602 (1964).
39 See 110 CONG. REc. 6547-49 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); see also Weber,
443 U.S. at 202-03 (1979).
Congress provided statistics by the Department of Labor to support its act. Representa-
tive Emmanuel Celler, the Chair of the House Judiciary Committee and the Floor Manager of
the Civil Rights Act in the House of Representatives, read the following:
Among male family breadwinners, the unemployment rate today among nonwhites
is thre[e] times what it is among whites. While nonwhites represent approximately
11 percent of the total civilian workforce, they represent more than 25 percent of
those who have been out of work for more than 26 weeks, the long-term unem-
ployed. Furthermore, the discrepancy between the white and nonwhite unemploy-
ment is steadily growing greater. In 1947, the nonwhite unemployment rate was 64
percent higher than the white unemployment rate; in 1952, 92 percent higher; and in
1999]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAWREVIEW
"employment opportunities for Negroes in occupations that have been
traditionally closed to them.,
40
Some individuals argue, however, that this interpretation of Title
VII's primary purpose is inconsistent with Title VII's broad purpose
to protect all persons from discrimination.41 This broad purpose to
protect all persons from discrimination was articulated most clearly
during the Title VII congressional debate over the distinction between
race and color. During this debate, Representative Celler, the Chair-
man of the House Judiciary Committee and Floor Manager of the
Civil Rights Act Debates in the House of Representatives, explained
explicitly that the statute was meant to protect Whites from discrimi-
nation as well.42 Representative Celler stated:
If, for example, the International Longshoremen's Associa-
tion... which is predominantly white, permitted no Negro
members, they would come under this act. This situation is
exactly the same if the colored International Longshoremen's
organization.., discriminated against a white person who is
qualified for membership. Both are clear examples of dis-
crimination. It works both ways.43
The Supreme Court also endorsed this broad interpretation of Title
VII in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.44 In McDonald, two
plaintiffs, both white employees of the defendant, filed a complaint
against their former employer, alleging racial discrimination under
Title VII.45 The white employees claimed that they were discrimi-
nated against when their employer discharged them for misappropri-
ating property while not discharging a black employee who had en-
gaged in similar behavior.46 The Supreme Court found for the plain-
1962, it was 124 percent higher. Nor are comparative unemployment rates the most
significant indicators of the extent to which discrimination in employment affects
racial minorities. Where the nonwhite are employed, it is generally in the lower paid
and less desirable jobs. For example, 17 percent of the employed nonwhites have
white-collar jobs; the corresponding proportion among whites is 47 percent. Four-
teen percent of all employed nonwhites are unskilled laborers in nonagricultural in-
dustries; the corresponding proportion among whites is only 4 percent.
40 110 CONG. REc. 6548 (1964) (statement of Sen. Humphrey); see also supra text ac-
companying note 32.
41 See, e.g., Scott Black, McDonnell Douglas' Prima Facie Case and the Non-Minority
Plaintiff. Is Modification Required?, 1994 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 319, 321-22 (1995) (arguing that
courts should apply the same factors of the McDonnell Douglas test to both white and black
plaintiffs); Janice C. Whiteside, Note, Title VII and Reverse Discrimination: The Prima Facie
Case, 31 IND. L. REV. 413,415-17 (1998) (same).
12 110 CONG. REC. 2552 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler).
43 Id.
44 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
41 See id. at 276.
4 See id.
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tiffs, asserting that Title VII protected Whites from discrimination
under the "same standards" applicable to non-Whites 47
Although these critics correctly note that Title VII has a broad
purpose of protecting everyone, their concern that such purpose can-
not co-exist with the narrower, primary purpose to protect Blacks is
unwarranted. It is entirely possible to concentrate on enforcing Con-
gress' primary intent of protecting Blacks from race discrimination in
employment, while still safeguarding all persons from such discrimi-
nation. In fact, the Supreme Court explained how these dual purposes
were not in conflict in United Steelworkers of Amer. v. Weber,48 a
case decided three years after McDonald. In Weber, a group of white
plaintiffs challenged a voluntary affirmative action program that
called for the reservation of 50 percent of the openings in "in-plant"
craft training programs for Blacks until the percentage of black craft-
workers was commensurate with the percentage of Blacks in the local
labor force.49 The plaintiffs alleged that the program discriminated
against them in violation of Title VII because it placed an unfair bur-
den on Whites.
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs' claims. In so doing,
the Court relied on the original purpose of Title VII: the integration of
minorities into mainstream society and the destruction of old patterns
of racial segregation and hierarchy.50 The Court stated:
It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's
concern over centuries of racial injustice and intended to im-
prove the lot of those who have 'been excluded from the
American dream for so long' constituted the first legislative
prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to
abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierar-
chy.5
1
In sum, the Weber Court, while recognizing that Whites can and do
experience race-based employment discrimination, reinforced Con-
gress' primary intent to have Title VII serve as a medium for eradi-
cating the structures that work to systematically discriminate against
Blacks. 2 Moreover, through its holding, the Weber Court made it
47 See id. at 280.
48 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
49 See id. at 197.
'0 See id. at 205, 208-09 (referring to the purpose gleaned from the congressional debates
over Title VII).
"' Id. at 204 (citation omitted) (quoting 110 CONG. REc. 2552 (1964) (statement of Sen.
Humphrey)).
52 The Supreme Court affirmed this principle in Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa Clara
County, California, 480 U.S. 616 (1987) (noting that an employer's voluntary affirmative action
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clear that the phrase "same standards" in McDonald did not mean in
the exact same way or by the exact same method. The Weber Court
understood that such a facial interpretation of the word "same" would
be contrary to Congress' primary purpose in enacting Title VII be-
cause this country's "past history of pervasive societal and institu-
tional discrimination could not be remedied simply by declaring that
all persons from now on would be treated equally.' 53 First, attempts
to equalize the playing field would have to be made.5 4
B. Exploring the McDonnell Douglas Prima Facie Case Test and its
Purpose
To apply the McDonnell Douglas test properly, courts, in addi-
tion to recognizing the primary purpose of Title VI, must also know
and understand the reasoning behind the creation of the McDonnell
Douglas test. This Part of the Article maintains that the sole purpose
of the McDonnell Douglas test is to determine whether discrimination
can be inferred from the facts, that the first prong of the test is crucial
to this determination, and that, as a result, the first prong of the test
should be modified to fit the facts of each case.
The Supreme Court gave its clearest explanation of the purpose
of the McDonnell Douglas test in Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters.55
The Court stated:
plan can play a crucial role in furthering Title Vii's purpose of eliminating the effects of dis-
crimination in the workplace); see also Barbara J. Fick, The Case For Maintaining and Encour-
aging the Use of Voluntary Affirmative Action in Private Sector Employment, I 1 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHIcs & Pun. POL'Y 159, 162 (1997) (stating that the "continuing applicability of the
Weber and Johnson decision to private sector affirmative action plans has not been undermined
by the Supreme Court's []ater] rulings on the use of set-asides and minority preferences").
53 Tack, supra note 31, at 964. See generally Fck, supra note 52, at 160-62.
54 See Ramirez, supra note 25, at 958 (quoting President Lyndon B. Johnson as saying:
"You do not take a person, who for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring
him up to the starting line of a race and then say 'you are free to compete with all the others,'
and still justly believe that you have been completely fair.").
5- 438 U.S. 567 (1978). In Furnco, three black bricklayers brought a race discrimination
suit under Title VII alleging that they had not been hired by the defendant because of their race.
The defendant claimed to hire only persons whom its job superintendent knew to be experienced
and competent in the relevant type of work or persons who had been recommended to the su-
perintendent as such. Id. at 570. The district court found that the defendant's hiring practices
were racially neutral, that such practices were a business necessity in that they were required for
the safe and efficient operation of the defendant's business, and that the practices were not used
as a pretext to exclude Blacks. Id. at 572-73. The Seventh Circuit heavily criticized the defen-
dant's employment practices, stating that such practices were not the best procedures for ensur-
ing that all applicants received a fair opportunity for employment, and reversed the district
court's decision. Id. at 573-74. The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit, holding that
the Court of Appeals could not impose different hiring practices on the defendant without first
finding that the defendant's hiring practices were a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 577-78.
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A prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas raises an infer-
ence of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if
otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the
consideration of impermissible factors. And we are willing
to presume this largely because we know from our experi-
ence that more often than not people do not act in a totally
arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially
in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for
rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible rea-
sons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the
employer who we generally assume acts only with some rea-
son, based his decision on an impermissible consideration
such as race.56
In other words, the sole purpose of the McDonnell Douglas test is to
answer one simple question: can unlawful discrimination against a
plaintiff be inferred from the circumstances?
To answer this question, courts must carefully consider the test's
first prong in each case.57 Without considering this factor, a court
cannot reasonably draw an inference of discrimination. After all, one
cannot assume racial discrimination against a white individual simply
because that individual is qualified for a job, applies for that job, is
rejected, and the employer continues to seek applicants for that job.
White individuals have not been historically denied positions for
which they are qualified on the basis of race. History reveals, how-
ever, that many qualified black applicants have not been hired for
jobs on the basis of their race alone. 58 It is this history of Blacks' ra-
cial disadvantage in the job market and in the workplace that makes it
possible for a court to draw an inference of discrimination for black
plaintiffs under the McDonnell Douglas test.5 9
Thus, before applying the McDonnell Douglas test, courts should
ask: is the plaintiff privileged or disadvantaged by his race under his
particular circumstances? 60 If a plaintiff is disadvantaged by race, in
16 id. at 577.
" See cunningham, supra note 30, at 452 ("In large measure, the inference of discrimina-
tion for the prima facie case exists because of the presumption of disadvantage in the workplace
that is identified in the first prong inquiry. Adverse treatment of an individual whose identity is
not privileged creates an inference of discrimination where that individual is qualified.'); Cal-
loway, supra note 14, at 1036-37.$ See supra Part I; see also infra Part H (discussing the history of employment discrimi-
nation against black job applicants, and its continued existence, despite the enactment of Title
vn).
59 See Calloway, supra note 14, at 1007-08 (noting that the underlying assumption on
which the McDonnell Douglas test is based is that "discrimination exists in this society and that
absent some other explanation, discrimination is the likely explanation for the adverse treatment
regularly experienced by women and members of minority groups").
6 See id.
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particular because he is black, then a court can reasonably infer, given
the history of racial discrimination in this country and proof of the
last three factors of the McDonnell Douglas test, that such individual
was discriminated against because of his race. On the other hand, if
an individual is privileged, in particular if he is a white male, it is un-
reasonable to infer discrimination, even with proof of the last three
factors of the test.61 This is because members of the majority as a
whole, in particular white males, "have not been hindered in the
workplace because of their race or sex.' 62
In sum, in applying the first prong of the McDonnell Douglas
test, courts cannot simply ignore the fact that the McDonnell Douglas
Court first required an inquiry into a plaintiff's racial status. A plain-
tiff's qualifications for a job, his rejection for that job, and that job's
vacancy are only three of the factors of the McDonnell Douglas prima
facie case test. The Supreme Court did not add the first prong of the
test for mere decoration. Without the first prong, the prima facie case
test becomes nothing more than a standing requirement-whether the
plaintiff belongs to a protected class. 63 According to the Court in
Furnco, the test is meant to serve the greater purpose of determining
whether discrimination can be inferred from the facts of the case.64 It
is unreasonable to make this determination without an inquiry into the
plaintiff's racial status in the employment context or in his work-
place.65
Some argue, however, that it is unreasonable to infer discrimina-
tion under the McDonnell Douglas test even where history shows that
the group to which a plaintiff belongs has been disadvantaged in em-
ployment. For example, in a memorandum to Justice Powell, Justice
Stevens noted the following argument regarding the McDonnell
61 See id; see also Bishopp v. District of Columbia, 788 F.2d 781, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1986);
Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981). See, e.g., Bhan-
dant v. AT&T, No. 85-1753, 1990 WL 13099, at *4 (D.N.J. 1990) (citing Jones v. Slater Steels
Corp., 660 F. Supp. 1570, 1575 (N.D. Ind. 1987) ("Although Title VII certainly prohibits dis-
crimination against a majority group, it 'makes little sense, within the historical context of the
Act, to infer discrimination against men in the same way that discrimination is inferred against
women."').
62 Bishopp, 788 F.2d at 786.
63 See cuningham, supra note 30, at 454-56 ("As of June 1997, the McDonnell Douglas
opinion has been cited in the majority opinions of 42 Supreme Court decisions. The prima facie
case was discussed in twelve of those forty-two cases. Not one Supreme Court majority opinion
citing McDonnell Douglas uses the 'protected class' characterization in describing the individ-
ual disparate treatment prima facie case.").
. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
65 Id.; see also cunningham, supra note 30, at 452 (arguing that an investigation into the
racial status of the plaintiff is necessary in order to make sense of the inference drawn under the
first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test).
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Douglas inference as it is applied to cases involving discrimination
against women:
'[The facts (1) that an applicant is qualified and (2) that a
person of the opposite sex was hired, do not in my judgment
give rise to an inference of discrimination. [T]his year I re-
jected two qualified female [applicants for clerkships to the
Supreme Court] and hired two qualified males. I do not be-
lieve those facts as applied to [this] year viewed separately
were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion, yet under your opinion they are sufficient.'
66
Admittedly, there are some hiring situations, such as those where
subjective standards play a strong role in the decision-making proc-
ess, in which the McDonnell Douglas inference of discrimination will
not be strong. However, the question here is not how strong or weak
the McDonnell Douglas inference of discrimination is in a particular
case but whether discrimination can be reasonably inferred in an ac-
tion based upon proof of the traditional prima facie factors. Given the
history of discrimination against women in the legal profession, in
particular in the Supreme Court clerkship hiring process, it is not so
clear that an inference of discrimination could not be reasonably
drawn from the scenario described by Justice Stevens. While the Su-
66 See Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93
MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2247-48 (1995) (quoting Memorandum from Justice Stevens to Justice
Powell (Jan. 22, 1981), in Justice Powell, Draft Opinion 5 (Burdine) (Jan. 14, 1981) (citations
omitted), in Thurgood Marshall Papers, Library of Congress, box 274, file 2)).
Title VII also protects women from discrimination in employment. The sex discrimi-
nation provision was added to Title VII as a ploy for defeating Title VII's prohibition on race
discrimination. See Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 428 n.36 (E.D. Mich.
1984), aff'd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987) ("This Court -
like all Title VII enthusiasts - is well aware that the sex discrimination prohibition was added to
Title VII as a joke by the notorious civil rights opponent Howard W. Smith. But the joke back-
fired on Smith when the amendment was adopted on the floor of the House .... ) (citing Fran-
cis J. Vans, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 431, 441-42 (1996));
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1283-
84 (1991) (same); see also Deborah Epstein, Can A Dumb Ass Woman"Achieve Equality in the
Workplace? Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J. 399,
409 n.62 (1996). But see Robert C. Bird, More Than a Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the
Legislative History of Sex Discrimination of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J.
WoMEN & L 137, 160 (1997) (arguing that Congress added sex as a result of subtle political
pressure from individuals, who for varying reasons, were serious about protecting the rights of
women).
This author recognizes that there can be problems in analogizing legal arguments re-
garding race and sex discrimination. See L. Camille Herbert, Analogizing Race and Sex in
Workplace Harassment Claims, 58 OHIo ST. L.J. 819 (1997) (arguing that analogizing sexual
harassment standards to claims of racial harassment may erode the ability of victims of race-
based harassment to prevail on legitimate claims). However, because this author believes that
Justice Stevens' argument is also applicable in the race discrimination context, this author finds
it appropriate to discuss a "sex-related" argument in this Article.
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preme Court began to regularly hire law clerks in 1922,67 its first true
female law clerk, Margaret J. Corcoran, was not hired until 1966.68 In
fact, the two current female Justices, Sandra Day O'Connor and Ruth
Bader Ginsburg, fell victim to discriminatory preferences for male
law clerks on the Supreme Court. For instance, although Justice
O'Connor graduated from Stanford Law School in the top of her class
in 1952, she could not obtain either a Supreme Court clerkship or a
job in a private law fir; 69 however, her male colleague and former
classmate, Justice William Rehnquist, who also graduated at the top
of his class, received a Supreme Court clerkship.70 Likewise, al-
though Justice Ginsburg graduated number one in her class from Co-
lumbia University Law School in 1959 and had been a member of the
Harvard Law Review before transferring to Columbia,71 Supreme
Court Justice Felix Frankfurter turned her down for a clerkship on the
basis of gender, and every law firm to which she applied refused to
employ her.72
67 See Mark R. Brown, Gender Discrimination in the Supreme Court's Clerkship Selection
Process, 75 OR. L. REv. 359,361 n.12 (1996). ("Justice Horace Gray hired the first law clerk in
1882, a former valedictorian from Harvard Law School, and paid him himself. In 1886, Con-
gress agreed to provide each Justice $1,600 annually for stenographic clerks.") (citing ELDER
WrIT, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY'S GuIDE To THE U.S. SUPRFEE COURT 769 (2d ed.
1990)). In 1922, Congress appropriated funds for each Justice to hire one clerk at an annual
salary of $3,600. Id. (citations omitted). Today, the United States Code states: "The Chief Jus-
tice of the United States, and the associate justices of the Supreme Court may appoint law clerks
and secretaries whose salaries shall be fixed by the Court." Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 675 (1988)).
68 See Id. at 362-63. Actually, the first female Supreme Court clerk was Justice William
Douglas' wartime selection of Lucille Lomen in 1944. However, because of the special circum-
stances created by the war, which allowed many women to engage in traditionally male jobs,
Ms. Lomen cannot be regarded as the first true female law clerk. Id. The low number of female
law clerks between 1922 and 1966, when Ms. Corcoran was hired, is due in part to the low
percentage of women in law school during this period. Id. For example, in 1965, women made
up only 4 percent of law school graduating classes. See Amelia A. Craig, Musing About Dis-
crimination Based on Sex and Sexual Orientation as "Gender Role" Discrimination, 5 S. CAL
REv. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 105, 106 (1995) (compiling statistics of women's status in employ-
ment).
69 See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Women's Progress in the Legal Profession in
the United States, 33 TULSA LJ. 13, 14 (1997).
79 See id.
71 See Mark S. Kende, Shattering the Glass Ceiling: A Legal Theory for Attacking Gender
Discrimination Against Women Partners, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 17, 28 n.49 (1994); see also Craig,
supra note 68, at 106.
72 Craig, supra note 68, at 106; see also Kende, supra note 71, at 28 n.49 ("[Justice Gins-
burg finally] landed a position as a law clerk for a federal district court judge but 'as anyone
familiar with the subject knows,. . . a man with those grades from that school could have gotten
a clerkship in a [flederal appeals court, if not the United States Supreme Court."') (quotations
omitted).
Judge Phyllis A. Kravitch, a United States Appellate Judge for the Eleventh Circuit,
also experienced gender discrimination while applying for a Supreme Court clerkship. Judge
Kravitch graduated at the top of her class at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. How-
ever, when she interviewed for a Supreme Court clerkship, the Justice who interviewed her told
her that he did not want to be the first Justice to hire a female law clerk. See Joseph Hoffmann,
A Tribute to the Honorable Phyllis A. Kravitch, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 353, 354-55 (1997).
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Furthermore, recent studies show that women are significantly
underrepresented as law clerks on the Supreme Court and that such
discrepancies are not due to poor performance in law school or on law
journals.73 For example, Professor Mark Brown conducted a study
that revealed that men comprised 99 percent of the Supreme Court
law clerks in the 1960s, 89 percent in the 1970s, and 76 percent in
both the 1980s and 1990s.74 In comparing the percentage of male
Supreme Court law clerks with the percentage of men at the 16 law
schools that produce almost 90 percent of the Supreme Court's clerks,
Professor Brown found that "during the 1970s the male clerkship rate
was 13 percentage points higher than the male enrollment at elite law
schools (89% versus 76%), 14 percentage points higher in the 1980s
(76% versus 61%), and 18 percentage points higher in the 1990s
(76% versus 58%). ,,75 Additionally, Professor Jane Kom reported data
which showed that, although 40 or more percent of all law school
graduates in the 1990s were women, the percentage of female Su-
preme Court law clerks varied from a low of 15 percent to a one-time
high of 36 percent.76 More specifically, Professor Korn's study
showed that women comprised 21 percent of Supreme Court law
clerks in 1990 while 42 percent of law school graduates, 28 percent of
the Supreme Court law clerks in 1991 while 43 percent of law school
graduates, 15 percent of the Supreme Court law clerks in 1992 while
43 percent of law school graduates, 31 percent of the Supreme Court
law clerks in 1993 while 42.5 percent of law school graduates, and 31
percent in 1994.77
73 See generally Brown, supra note 67.
74 See id. at 364.
75 Id. at 366-67. Professor Brown also analyzed a random sample of 1,000 clerks for the
United States Court of Appeals. In this study, he found that the percentage of those positions
held by women consistently lagged behind the percentage of women students at top law schools.
See Deborah Jones Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, Sex, Race, and Credentials: The Truth About
Affirmative Action in Law School Faculty Hiring, 97 CoLuli. L. REV. 199, 286-87 n.260
(1997); see also Sarah E. Thiemann, Beyond Guinier: A Critique of Legal Pedagogy, 24 N.Y.U.
REv. L & SOC. CH-ANGE 17, 31-32 (1998) (finding that among NYU law students, with the
exception of the judicial term for 1997-98, men have consistently received more clerkships than
women).
76 See Jane Byeff Kom, Institutional Sexism: Responsibility and Intent, 4 TEX. J. WOMEN
& L 83, 98-100 (1995); see also Jean C. Love, Twenty Questions on the Status of Women Stu-
dents in Your Law School, 11 Wis. WOMEN'S L.J. 405,411 n.21 (1997).
'n See Kom, supra note 76, at 100 n.71. Women comprised 21% of Supreme Court law
clerks in 1983 while 35% of law school graduates; 22% in 1984 while 37% of law school
graduates; 22% in 1985 while 38% of law school graduates; 31% in 1986 while 39% of law
school graduates; 23.5% in 1987 while 40% of law school graduates; 36% in 1988 while 41% of
law school graduates; and 33% in 1989 while 41% of law school graduates. See id.
More recently, a debate regarding the scarcity of minority law clerks has emerged. The
current President of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
("NAACP"), Kweisi Mfume, planned and participated in a protest of the Justices' hiring prac-
tices. He and 18 other individuals were arrested as they crossed a police barricade leading to the
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However, even more important than recognizing the reasonable-
ness of drawing an inference of sex discrimination in the Stevens sce-
nario is an understanding that it would be unreasonable to draw such
an inference if the scenario involved Justice Stevens' choosing two
qualified female applicants over two qualified male applicants. In-
deed, given the preferences that have traditionally been accorded to
men in the Supreme Court hiring process, it would be irrational to
draw this inference without proof of unusual background circum-
stances.
Furthermore, the fact that the inference of discrimination may be
weaker in some cases involving the use of subjective criteria does not
negate the importance of the McDonnell Douglas test. Indeed, one
could argue that the McDonnell Douglas test serves a more important
function in cases where subjective factors play a strong role in the
decision-making process because discrimination is more difficult to
prove in these cases. In fact, several studies show that these situa-
tions require special protection, as racial bias can filter into the sub-
jective portion of the hiring process in a number of ways. Most spe-
cifically, the bias appears in the interview process, a process that gen-
erally precedes employer hiring decisions. For example, a psycho-
logical study of interview processes done at Princeton University
demonstrates one of the ways in which interview processes are not
racially neutral.78
courthouse steps to give the Justices the resumes of qualified minority law school graduates. See
Cliff Hocker, No Justice, No Peace: Diversity Is Needed Among Law Clerks, 12 NAT'L BAR
Assoc. MAG., Nov-Dec. 1998, at 26. Mfume stated, "[t]he fact that the nine justices who sit on
the highest court in the land do not practice equal opportunity exposes a great deal of hypoc-
risy." Id.; cf Randall Kennedy, The Clerkship Question and the Court, AMERICAN LAWYER,
Apr. 1999, at 114. (noting that the paucity of minorities in the highest circles of the legal profes-
sion is a problem but asserting that it stems from many sources, "including the social inequities
that effectively bar all too many blacks from any higher education ... and customs and reflexes
that make it more difficult for black law students to gain access to the valuable social networks
that advance careers in the law").
Of the 394 law clerks hired by the current nine Justices, Blacks represent less than 2
percent, Asian-Americans represent 5 percent, and Latinos represent 1 percent. No Native
Americans have ever clerked on the Supreme Court. See Linn Washington, Jr., Bringing More
Blacks To Clerking, 13 NAT'L BAR Assoc. MAG., Jan-Feb. 1999, at 34; Hocker, supra at 77
(citing similar statistics).
This fall, of the 35 clerks who will work for the sitting Justices, two are Black and three
are of Asian heritage. This will be the largest number of minority clerks in recent memory.
Court employees could not recall any recent term in which the Justices had employed more than
three minority clerks. Randy Jones of the National Bar Association commented on the Justices'
current hiring decisions, stating: "It's clear that our effort has had a positive effect on the hearts
and minds of the justices. But we are far from done." Supreme Court Hires Two Black Law
Clerks, JET, Sept. 27, 1999, at 4.
78 See Luke Charles Harris & Uma Narayan, Affirmative Action and the Myth of Prefer-
ential Treatment: A Transformative Critique of the Terms of the Affirmative Action Debate, 11
HARV. BLACKLErrER J. 1, 21 (1994) (citing Mark Snyder, Self-Fulfilling Stereotypes,
PSYCHOL. TODAY, July 1982, at 60, 65-67).
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This study consisted of two steps. The first step involved inter-
views of both white and black job applicants by white undergradu-
ates. Unknown to these undergraduate interviewers, the applicants
were all associated with the project and were trained to behave con-
sistently from interview to interview. The first step of the study re-
ported that interviewers spent less time with black applicants andS 79
were less friendly and outgoing with black applicants! The second
step of the study began with interviews of white applicants by con-
federates of the experimenters. These confederates were trained to
approximate the two styles of interviewing observed during the first
step of the project.80 After these interviews were finished, a panel of
judges reviewed tapes and reported that white applicants subjected to
the style previously accorded Blacks performed noticeably worse in
the interviews than other white applicants.81 In sum, in cases con-
cerning either the objective or subjective qualifications of an appli-
cant, the history and experience of discrimination against Blacks in
the workplace allows for the drawing of a reasonable inference of
discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas test.
I. UNDERSTANDING WHITE PRIVILEGE AND THE REASONS FOR
APPLYING A DIFFERENT STANDARD OF PROOF TO WHITE PLAINTIFFS
UNDER THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS PRIMA FACIE TEST
When one considers the function of the McDonnell Douglas test
as explained in Part I, it becomes clear that courts must, in order to
apply the test properly, have an understanding of the racial status of
Whites as compared to Blacks in the employment context. This Part
describes the current employment situation of Whites as compared to
Blacks and contends that it is only reasonable for courts to apply a
different first prong to white plaintiffs under the McDonnell Douglas
test. First, this Part establishes that the employment differences be-
tween Whites and Blacks that sparked the enactment of Title VII still
exist today. It then demonstrates how the perpetuation of these con-
ditions is linked to employers' negative racial stereotypes of Blacks
and employers' preferences for Whites on the job market. This Part
also maintains that there is no reason to think that discrimination
against Whites has increased such that courts can infer discrimination
for Whites and Blacks based on the exact same factors in the McDon-
nell Douglas test.
" See id.
' See id.
"' See hL
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The enactment of Title VII helped to influence the emergence of
the black middle class in the 1970s and 1980s.82 The 1980s saw an
increase in the numbers of Blacks in colleges and universities, black
professionals, black managers, black administrators, and black home-
owners.83 Although there has been an increase in the number of black
college students and black professionals since the enactment of Title
VII, the position of Blacks in society, as compared to Whites, has not
improved.84 An examination of relevant statistics demonstrates this
point.
First, statistics show that the ratio between the employment rate
for Blacks and Whites have remained nearly the same since 1963. In
1963, the Department of Labor Census Report showed that the aver-
age rate of unemployment for Blacks was 10.9 percent, while the rate
for Whites was less than half that--only 5.1 percent. 85 In 1997, the
Department of Labor Census Report showed that the unemployment
rate for Whites was again less than half that for Blacks-at 4.2 per-
cent as compared to 9.4 percent.86
Additionally, reports show that while a new black middle and
educated class has emerged, this new class remains small in num-
bers.87 For the majority of Blacks, little has changed. In fact, for
82 See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF
THE NEW URBAN POOR 193-94 (1996).
83 See id.
84 See id. See generally BERGMANN, supra note 36 (arguing that despite the enactment of
Title VII and similar initiatives, the situation of minorities in employment has not significantly
improved).
8 See 110 CONG. REC. 2604 (1964).
86 See UNITED STATES DEP'T. OF LAB. BUREAU LAB. STAT., EMP. AND EARNINGS 9,
Aug. 1997, at 9.
The unemployment ratio for White and Blacks remained the same during the years
between 1963 and 1997. In fact, in 1988, the black unemployment rate was 2.57 times the white
unemployment rate, which was the highest Black-to-White employment differential ever re-
corded. See Leroy D. Clark, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment
by DavidA. Strauss, 79 GEO. L.J 1695, 1701 (1991).
87 The 1996 Statistical Abstract of the United States shows that, in 1995, Blacks made up
only 4.7 percent of all engineers, 4.9 percent of all physicians, 1.9 percent of all dentists, 6.2
percent of all college and university professors, and 3.6 percent of all lawyers and judges. See
U.S. DEP'T. OF COMM. STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE U.S. 405 (116th ed. 1996). Addition-
ally, the Glass Ceiling Commission Fact-Finding Report found that, in Fortune 1000 industrial
corporations and Fortune 500 service corporations, 97 percent of senior level managers are
White, 0.6 percent are Black, 0.3 percent are Asian, 0.4 percent are Latino, and 3 to 5 percent
are women. See Fick, supra note 52, at 163 (citing GLASS CEILING COMMISSION, DEPARTMENT
OF LABOR, GOOD FOR BUSINESS: MAKING FULL USE OF THE NATION'S HUMAN CAPITAL 9
(1995)).
This is not to say that the ameliorative, race-based remedies instituted during the Civil
Rights Movement have been meaningless. In fact, this author contends that, without these
remedies, Blacks would have experienced even less progress in employment. See generally
Thomas E. Hanson, Jr., Note, Rising Above the Past: Affirmative Action as a Necessary Means
of Raising the Black Standard of Living as Well as Self-Esteem, 16 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 107
(1996) (detailing the merits of affirmative action).
[Vol. 50:53
WHEN DIFFERENT MEANS THE SAME
many Blacks, socioeconomic conditions have worsened.8 Statistics
show that the economic gains of the Civil Rights Movement are con-
centrated among the highest quintile of Blacks.8 9 William Julius Wil-
son, a sociologist at Harvard University, notes:
From 1975 to 1992... while the average income of the low-
est quintile of black families in the United States declined by
33 percent (from $6,333 to $4,255) and that of the second
lowest quintile by 13 percent (from $13,186 to $11,487), the
average income of the highest quintile of black families
climbed by 23 percent (from $55,681 to $68,431) and that of
the top 5 percent by 35 percent (from $76,713 to $103,827).90
However, even more important than the disparities between the
incomes of lower class and middle to upper middle-class Blacks are
the disparities between the incomes of Whites and Blacks. Studies
reveal that there is a substantial gap between the incomes of Whites
and Blacks, even among the highest quintiles.91 Just as with the em-
ployment rates between Blacks and Whites, the wage gap between
Blacks and Whites has also remained relatively the same since the
enactment of Title VII. For instance, statistics show that the gap be-
tween the median adjusted income for Whites and Blacks was nearly
the same in 1969 and 1991. In 1969, the median adjusted income for
Blacks was 1.44 times the poverty line, or about 53 percent of that of
Whites.92 In 1991, the median adjusted income for Blacks was 1.85,
or about 52 percent of that of Whites.93 Furthermore, in 1959, black
males from ages 24 to 65 who had completed elementary school
earned median incomes equal to 62 percent of their white counter-
" See generally WILSON, supra note 82, at 194-95.
From 1977 to 1993, the percentage of Blacks with incomes below 50 percent of the
amount designated as the poverty line (the measurement of "poverty" was $14,335
for a four-person family and $11,522 for a three-person family in 1993) increased
from 9.3 percent of the total black population in 1977 to 16.7 percent in 1993. In
1977, fewer than one in every three poor blacks (29.9 percent) fell below half of the
poverty-line amount, but by 1993 the proportion rose to more than half (50.4 per-
cent).
Id.
89 See id. at 195 (noting that, in 1992, the highest fifth of black families secured a record
48.8 percent of the total black family income).
90 See id. at 196.
91 Id.; see also BERGMANN, supra note 36, at 37-38 (demonstrating that black men's in-
flation-adjusted incomes have declined relative to white men's since 1976). See generally Debo-
rah C. Malamud, Affirmative Action, Diversity, and the Black Middle Class, 68 U. COLO. L.
REv. 939, 967-88 (1997) (demonstrating that the black middle class is worse off than the white
middle class in numerous economic dimensions).
92 See SHELDON DANZIGER & PETER GOTrSCHALK, AMERICA UNEQUAL 73 (1995).
93 Id. Also, in 1992, 33.3 percent of Blacks and 29.9 percent of Latinos lived in poverty
as compared to 11.6 percent of Whites. See Stacey Patton, Apologize For Slavery? Yes-With
Deeds, BALT. SUN, June 20, 1997, at A13.
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parts. Among high school and college graduates, black males earned
respective salaries of only 70 percent and 62 percent of those earned
by similarly situated Whites.94 Although the total wage gap between
Blacks and Whites fell during the 1960s and 1970s, studies showed
that this differential widened during the 1980s. 95 In 1995, reports re-
vealed that black men's wages equaled 73 percent of white men's
wages and that black women's wages equaled 63 percent of white
men's wages.9 6 Reports also showed that black women earned 83
cents for every dollar made by white women and that Latinas earned
71 cents for every dollar made by white women.97 Lastly, reports
indicated that Whites have accrued ten times more wealth savings and
assets, such as homes--than Blacks and Latinos.98
In sum, statistics reveal that Whites generally are more privi-
leged than Blacks with regard to socioeconomic class and employ-
ment. Given this fact, it is unreasonable for courts to apply the same
first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test to white and black plain-
tiffs who are bringing race discrimination cases. After all, the import
of the first prong turns on whether the plaintiff is privileged or disad-
vantaged by his race under the circumstances. If Whites are generally
privileged within the hiring context, it only makes sense to require a
white plaintiff to show that he is disadvantaged because of his race in
his particular circumstances before he can benefit from an inference
of discrimination based on racial disadvantage.
Some argue that disparities in the employment and earnings of
Blacks and Whites alone cannot necessarily be viewed as evidence of
white privilege within the hiring context. Even beyond statistics,
however, demonstrative evidence of discrimination exists. Over the
years, researchers have conducted audits that suggest that Whites are
privileged in the hiring context. A study by the Urban Institute dem-
94 See Hanson, supra note 87, at 111-12.
95 See Robert K. Toutkoushian, Racial and Marital Differences in Faculty Pay, 69 J.
Higher Educ. 513, 514 (1998).
96 See BERGMANN, supra note 36, at 38. In 1996, studies revealed that the median in-
comes for Black and Latino families were far less than that of Whites, $26,500 and $26,100
respectively as compared to $47,100. See Jodi Enda, White House report says affirmative action
a success, DENY. POST, Feb. 10, 1998, at Cl. Asian families had the highest median income at
$49,100. See id. However, greater proportions of Asians live below the poverty level than
Whites. See Michael Fletcher, Race Board's Focus Turns to Economic Gap; Range of Explana-
tions Offered for Disparity, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 1998, at A8.
Studies also show that the workplace is still highly segregated. A 1993 survey of work-
ers showed that 40 percent of laborers, 91.5 percent of managers, 48.6 of professionals, 52.6
percent of technicians, and 86.4 percent of supervisors worked only with people of their race.
See BERGMANN, supra note 36, at 37-38 (citing DONALD TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, GENDER &
RACIAL INEQUALITY AT WORK: THE SOURCES & CONSEQUENCE OF JOB SEGREGATION (1993)).
97 See Sarah Wyatt, Administration Urges Toughening of Equal Pay Laws, CHARLOTTE
GAzETrE, Apr. 3, 1998, at 6C.
98 See Enda, supra note 96, at Cl.
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onstrated one of the ways in which Whites have been preferred on the
job market. In 1990, the Urban Institute sent out pairs of auditors,
one black, one white, to respond to newspaper advertisements for jobs
in the Chicago and Washington D.C. area.99 These test subjects were
carefully matched in terms of experience, age, physical strength and
size, and education. They were also trained such that attributes like
demeanor, openness, articulateness, and energy level were as close to
each other as possible.1° Additionally, their biographies were created
to make the pair identical in terms of a defined set of qualifications.
101
Despite all of the similarities between the auditors, the study showed
that the white auditors both advanced further in the hiring process and
received job offers at a significantly higher rate than black auditors.
In 20 percent of the cases, the white candidate advanced farther, and
in 15 percent only the white candidate received a job offer.102
These results are consistent with the results of a General Ac-
counting Office (GAO) investigation examining employment dis-
crimination against Latinos.103 The GAO investigations involved
sending pairs of Anglo and Latino job seekers to 360 employers in
Chicago and San Diego. In 58 percent of the cases, the applicants
were treated similarly, but in 31 percent of the cases, the Latino
auditor encountered unfavorable treatment.1 4 One example of such
treatment took place in the following case: A pair of testers applied
for a "counter help" job at a lunch service company. Both testers had
similar work experience. The advertisement requested that interested
applicants apply in person. The Latino applicant went in and told the
manager that he wanted to apply for the job. The tester reported that
the manager studied him and then told him that the position was
filled. The white tester came in two hours later and told the manager
99 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Constitution in Context: The Continuing Significance
of Racism, 63 U. CoLo. L REv. 325, 339 (1992) (citing MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER Er AL.,
OPPORTUNmES DIMINISHED: RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN HIRING 11, Urban Inst. Report 91-9,
1991).
' See id. at 339.
'0' See id. at 340.
102 See id. The Urban Institute reported that its results were significant at the 99 percent
confidence level. See Calloway, supra note 14, at 1030. The authors of the report speculated
that their results underrepresented the problem of discrimination because their results were
based on positions advertised in newspapers rather than in employment agencies where there are
more opportunities for discrimination. l The authors also speculated that their study underrep-
resented discrimination because all of the auditors participating in the study were actually col-
lege students and were overqualified for the positions for which they applied. kId at 1030-3 1.
Furthermore, the qualifications of the black auditors were substantially higher than those of the
average black applicant for entry-level jobs. Id at 1031.
103 See Aleinikoff, supra note 99, at 340 (citing GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
IMMIGRATION REFORM: EMPLOYER SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION
(1990)).
104 See itL at 340-41.
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that he wished to apply for the job. The manager asked him to com-
plete a short application, interviewed him for about three minutes, and
hired him immediately.
10 5
The Fair Employment Council of Greater Washington ("FEC")
also conducted employment testing studies of black and white job
applicants in the D.C. area between 1990 and 1991.1°6 The results of
the FEC's study were similar to those of the Urban Institute's study.
The FEC results indicated that the black testers were treated signifi-
cantly worse than white testers 24 percent of the time and that Latinos
were treated worse than Whites 22 percent of the time. 107 Job offers
were given to 46.9 percent of the white testers but only 11.3 percent
of the black testers.108 In those cases where job offers were given to
both black and white testers, Whites were offered higher wages 16.7
percent of the time.'09
In addition to these audits, other studies have shown that many
empl6yers favor Whites during the hiring process because of their
perceptions of Blacks as being uneducated, lazy, dishonest, and unco-
operative." 0 Such discrimination is often referred to as statistical dis-
crimination: "making judgments about an applicant's productivity,
which are often too difficult or too expensive to measure, on the basis
of his or her race, ethnic background, or class.""' For example, one
study completed by scholars Jomills Henry Braddock I and James
McPartland revealed that "attitudinal traits are at least as important as
educational training in hiring decisions for many jobs, especially jobs
filled by high school graduates;" that the average employer perceives
racial differences related to these attitudinal traits; and that such em-
ployers are more likely to avoid hiring Blacks and more likely to hire
'o- See id. at 340.
106 See Fick, supra note 52, at 164 (citing Marc Bendick, Jr. et al., Measuring Employment
Discrimination Through Controlled Experiments, 23 REV. BLACK POL ECON. 25, 29 (1994));
see also MICHAEL Fix AND RAYMOND J. STRUYK, EDS., CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE:
MEASUREMENT OF DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA (1993) (citing the same study).
107 See Fick, supra note 52, at 164.
log See id.
'9 See id.
110 See generally Wilson, supra note 82, at 111-46 (documenting interviews with numer-
ous employers in the Chicago area regarding negative perceptions of minority job candidates as
a group). See, e.g., Joleen Kirschenman & Kathryn M. Neckerman, "We'd Love to Hire Them,
But... ": The Meaning of Race for Employers, in RACE AND ETHNIC CONFLICT: CONTENDING
VIEVs ON PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION AND ETHNOVIOLENCE 115-23 (FRED L. PNCUS &
HOWARD J. EHRLICH, EDS. 1994).
' See WILSON, supra note 82, at 129. See generally Kirschenman & Neckerman, supra
note 110.
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Whites, particularly for jobs where attitudinal traits are important,
because they perceive Blacks as higher risk employees
1 12
More recently, scholars Joleen Kirschenman and Kathym Neck-
erman conducted a survey that exposed the manner in which racial
stereotyping, especially among blue-collar employers, has led to sta-
tistical discrimination against Blacks and preferences for Whites in
the job market 1 3 During this study, Kirschenman and Neckerman
asked several employers whether they thought there were any differ-
ences in the work ethics of Whites, Blacks, and Hispanics. 114 Out of
these employers, 37.7 percent ranked Blacks last, 1.4 ranked Hispan-
ics last, and not one ranked Whites last.115 Another 7.6 percent of
these employers placed Blacks and Hispanics together on the lowest
level, and 51.4 percent either saw no difference or refused to catego-
rize in a straightforward way.
16
In addition to these rankings, Kirschenman and Neckerman
noted numerous comments made by employers which suggest that
employers may favor white applicants in the employment process
because of their negative perceptions of Blacks' work ethic and their
positive perceptions of Whites' work ethic.11 7 For example, one em-
ployer stated: "For all groups, the pride [in their work] of days gone
by is not there, but what is left, I think probably the whites take more
pride than some of the other minorities.' '1 8 Another employer stated,
"[the Polish immigrants that I know and know of are more highly
motivated than the Hispanics. The Hispanics share in some of the
problems that the blacks do [which include] exposure to poverty and
drugs [and] lack of motivation. ' 1 9 One employer even expressed his
112 See Fick, supra note 52, at 166-67 (quoting Jomills Henry Braddock II & James M.
McPartland, How Minorities Continue to Be Excluded from Equal Employment Opportunities:
Research on Labor Market and Institutional Barriers, 43 J. SOC. IsstJB 5, 13 [1987]).
113 See Kirschenman & Neckerman, supra note 110, at 115-23.
11 See id. at 118.
115 See id.
116 See hi ("[Many of these employers] qualified their response by saying they saw no
differences once one controlled for education, background, or environment, and that any differ-
ences were more the result of class and space."); see also Calloway, supra note 14, at 1029
(citing studies that reported that 62 percent of Whites consider Blacks to be less hard-working
than Whites and that, compared to Jews, Blacks, Asians, southern Whites, and Whites in gen-
eral, Americans perceive Latinos as second only to Blacks as being lazy and living off welfare
rather than self-supporting).
117 See generally Kirschenman & Neckerman, supra note 110, at 115-23.
118 Id. at 118.
119 Id. Below are just a few examples of the comments that Wilson cited in his book,
When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor. One example consisted of the
following statement by a manufacturer, who had no firsthand experience with black workers.
He said that he heard:
mhey [black men] don't want to work, they don't want to do anything.
I think that's a big part of it. I don't think anybody wants to admit it but
I think that's primarily it .... They're ignorant, they don't work, they
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desire to maintain a predominantly white workforce for the sake of
maintaining good relations among workers, stating that if he "had one
[black worker] back there it might be okay, but if [has] two or more
[he] would have trouble."120
Reports not only reveal that race affects whether black and white
individuals initially receive jobs from employers but which jobs they
receive. 121 For example, the results of a 1986 study on the effect of
applicant race on job placement showed that white personnel officers
tend to assign black male high school graduates to lower paying posi-
tions than those assigned to white male high school graduates. 122 The
study also found that, among college graduates, race was a significant
determinant of a female's job status. 23 Additionally, the recent Tex-
aco class action revealed some of the discrimination problems that
Blacks face with opportunities for promotions in corporate Amer-
ica. 124  At Texaco, Black managers were constantly being forced to
train Whites who received promotions despite the fact that the black
managers had more experience, education, and seniority.
125
don't want to work... they got a real bad rap, and huh... nobody, I
don't think anybody will come out and admit it, but I think that's the
first thing they consider in a black applicant.
See WILSON, supra note 82, at 122.
Another example consists of the following statement by a manufacturer. In an inter-
view, one employer admitted that racial employment discrimination against Blacks is not only
influenced by racist stereotyping but also by employers' pure bias and prejudice against Blacks,
stating:
Well, I don't know about their ability to hang onto the job, or retain it, but their
ability to find them is probably rooted in the fact that there's, now I'm going to go
back twenty years now, I think that today there's more bias and prejudice against the
black man than there was twenty years ago. I think twenty years ago, fifteen years
ago, ten years ago, white male employers like myself were willing to give anybody
and everybody the opportunity, not because it was the law, but because it was the
right thing to do, and today I see more prejudice and more racial bias in employers
than I've ever seen before.
Id. at 129.
120 Kirschenman & Neckerman, supra note 110, at 119.
121 See Fick, supra note 52, at 167 (citing Jonills Henry Braddock Ill et al., Applicant
Race and Job Placement Decisions: A National Survey Experiment, 6 INT'L J. SOC. & SOC.
POL'Y 3, 21 (1986)).
12 See id. (quoting Braddock et al., supra note 121 at 21). This study was conducted by
the Center for Social Organization of Schools at Johns Hopkins University and was based on a
national survey of 1101 personnel officers and other executives responsible for hiring.
'23 See id.
124 See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Book Review, The Verdict on Roberts vs. Texaco, 15
HARV. BLACKLETTER J. 228, 231-32 (Spring 1999) (detailing some of the difficulties faced by
minority corporate employees at Texaco); see also Linn Washington, Jr., Racism at Texaco,
PHIL. TRE., Nov. 29, 1996, at 5A
125 See generally BARI-ELLEN ROBERTS, ROBERTS V. TEXACO: A TRUE STORY OF RACE
AND CORPORATE AMERICA (1998) (discussing the hardships faced by minorities attempting to
procure corporate promotions).
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In sum, several studies suggest that Whites are privileged in the
hiring and promotion context because of societal racism, employers'
negative perceptions of the work ethic of minorities, their positive
perceptions of the work ethic of Whites, and employers' fears of
problems caused by having an integrated workforce. These studies
add further support to this Article's argument that it is unreasonable
to infer discrimination for white plaintiffs based solely upon the last
three prongs of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case test. Given
the fact that the employment differences between Whites and Blacks
have not changed between the 1960s and the 1990s and the informa-
tion from audits and studies on racial stereotyping and discrimination,
it is clear that Whites are privileged as compared to Blacks and other
minorities within the employment context. 126 Because white job ap-
plicants are generally favored by employers, it makes no sense for
courts to infer discrimination for white applicants absent a showing
that their employer is that unusual employer who discriminates
against the majority. In other words, there is little reason to think that
employment discrimination against Blacks in employment has de-
creased or that employment discrimination against Whites has in-
creased, such that courts should begin to evaluate the discrimination
claims of Blacks and Whites under the same factors of the McDonnell
Douglas test. 27
Furthermore, such evidence suggests not only that Blacks are
deeply harmed by racial discrimination in the job market but also that
competing Whites have benefited from such discrimination against
Blacks, in particular from discrimination based on negative stereo-
types of Blacks. As the D.C. Circuit stated in Parker, given the status
of Whites as compared to Blacks in today's society, "it defies com-
mon sense to suggest that the promotion of a black justifies an infer-
ence of prejudice against white co-workers in our present society.' ' 28
Moreover, an important question is raised as to whether the dif-
ferent prima facie case test for Whites is actually different at all. As
previous sections have shown, equal treatment between Blacks and
Whites does not always happen. The different test requires only that
126 See Peter Gene Baroni, Case Note, Background Circumstances: An Elevated Standard
of Necessity In Reverse Discrimination Claims Under Title VII, 39 How. L.J. 797, 810-811
(1996).
127 See Walters, supra note 2, at 604-05 ("No evidence exists establishing that the domi-
nant status of white males in the labor force has been seriously challenged by affirmative ac-
tion.") (citations omitted).
128 Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012, 1017 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see also
Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 152 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Invidious discrimination against whites is
relatively uncommon in our society, and so there is nothing inherently suspicious in an em-
ployer's decision to promote a qualified minority applicant instead of a qualified white appli-
cant.").
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Whites present evidence indicating that their circumstances in the
field of employment are similar to those faced by Blacks on a regular
basis. In other words, the "background circumstances requirement"
merely substitutes for the black plaintiff's burden to show that he is a
member of a racial minority. It is not meant to disadvantage Whites
but rather to level the playing field. 129 The modified test for Whites is
not different at all. It simply ensures that the circumstances for both
traditional discrimination and reverse discrimination cases involving
white employers are similar.
m. ADDRESSING THE POLICY REASONS FOR, AND ARGUMENTS
AGAINST, APPLYING THE DIFFERENT TEST
Additionally, there are a number of policy reasons for choosing
to apply the background circumstances test to white plaintiffs in re-
verse discrimination cases. First, if courts were to apply the same
McDonnell Douglas test to white and black plaintiffs in discrimina-
tion cases, courts would undermine Supreme Court precedent, in par-
ticular the Weber and Johnson decisions which upheld the right of
employers to voluntarily adopt affirmative action programs. Courts
would do so by allowing Whites to more easily challenge affirmative
action programs under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Nor-
mally, in the McDonnell Douglas framework, the burden remains on
the plaintiff to prove discrimination; the employer need only articu-
late a non-discriminatory reason for not hiring or promoting the
plaintiff. In reverse discrimination cases that involve a challenge to
an affirmative action program, however, courts that apply the same
test to both white and black plaintiffs require the employer to do more
than simply articulate its reason for not hiring or promoting the plain-
tiff (that is, if the reason is that the selected individual was chosen
pursuant to an affirmative action plan). Instead, these courts require
the employer to produce evidence that its plan is a response to a con-
spicuous imbalance in its workforce or that its program is reasonably
related to the plan's remedial purpose. 30 In sum, in these courts, any
29 See Harding, 9 F.3d at 154 (stating that the "background circumstances' requirement is
not an additional hurdle for white plaintiffs"). But see Baroni, supra note 126, at 815-17 (argu-
ing that the "background circumstances" requirement is an additional hurdle for white plaintiffs
and that the prima facie standards should be more onerous for white plaintiffs because the "his-
torical, societal patterns of race and gender discrimination in employment that Title VII was
enacted to combat did not and do not apply to majority plaintiffs") (citations omitted).
130 See, e.g., Commons v. Montgomery Ward & Company, 614 F. Supp. 443,448 (D. Kan.
1985) (refusing to allow an employer to use its affirmative action plan as a defense where the
employer had not produced such evidence); see also Collins v. Sch. Dist. of Kansas City, 727 F.
Supp. 1318, 1320-21 & n.1 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (adopting the Setser requirement that the em-
ployer in a reverse discrimination case must produce evidence of the need for an affirmative
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white individual who files a reverse discrimination action can force
an employer to defend its affirmative action plan, regardless of
whether there is any hint of discrimination against Whites in the
workplace.
This in effect places the institution of affirmative action under
undue fire and may, in some instances, discourage employers from
voluntarily adopting such programs, an act which was approved, sup-
ported, and encouraged by the Supreme Court in both Weber and
Johnson.131 On the other hand, courts that apply the background cir-
cumstances test recognize that even the existence of an illegal af-
firmative action plan may not be a sufficient basis upon which to
draw an inference of discrimination. Thus, these courts require a
white plaintiff to show that the plan was applied in a way suggesting a
tendency to discriminate against Whites to satisfy the requirements of
the McDonnell Douglas test.
132
Second, the application of the same McDonnell Douglas test to
white and black plaintiffs would deprive employers of the "screening
out benefits" that the McDonnell Douglas test was intended to pro-
vide through the motions process.1 33 For example, the district court in
Stock v. Universal Foods Corp.134 deprived an employer of such
prima facie screening benefits when it applied the traditional prima
facie case test to a plaintiff where there was not only no reason to be-
lieve that white males were discriminated against by the employer but
where the circumstances suggested that there was pervasive discrimi-
nation against minorities. In Stock, a white male applicant, Stock,
brought a reverse discrimination case to challenge the hiring of an
allegedly unqualified black applicant. Stock sought a promotion at
Universal Foods Corporation. Universal had a practice of recruiting
its new employees by word of mouth, a hiring practice that resulted in
action plan in its workforce and evidence that the plan is reasonably related to its remedial pur-
pose).
131 See supra text accompanying notes 48-54.
132 See, e.g., McHenry v. Commonwealth of Pa. State Sys. of Higher Educ., No. 98-2468,
1999 WL 391373, at *10 (E.D. Pa. May 11, 1999) (holding that, even assuming that illegal
affirmative action practices existed, i.e. the use of quotas, the plaintiff had failed to establish a
prima facie case because he failed to show that such policies were relied upon in deciding not to
hire him or other similarly situated white males, and thus failed to show a tendency on the part
of his employer to discriminate against white males).
133 See Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 457 (7th Cir. 1999). The prima
facie burden of McDonnell Douglas allows employers to screen out unsubstantiated discrimina-
tion charges and to avoid unnecessary litigation and expense by allowing them to file a motion
to dismiss or for summary judgment where the plaintiff cannot distinguish his case from the
ordinary, legitimate kind of adverse employment action. See Jayasinghe v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 760 F.2d 132, 134 (7th Cir. 1985).
'1 817 F. Supp. 1300 (D. Md. 1993), aff'd, No. 93-1448, 1994 WL 10682 (4th Cir., Jan.
19, 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 813 (1994).
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an almost completely white workforce. In early 1991, an audit by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") revealed
violations of Executive Order 11246,135 as well as various federal fair
employment statutes and regulations. In an effort to remedy these
violations, Universal developed and adopted an affirmative action
program, which described its past deficiencies, new hiring policies,
and hiring goals for fiscal year 1991.136
In late August or early September of 1991, a position in Univer-
sal's maintenance department became available. Stock learned of the
opening from a maintenance mechanic at Universal. The mechanic
later recommended Stock to the Maintenance Superintendent, Ronald
Miller, for an interview. Miller, who was unfamiliar with Universal's
new affirmative action program, interviewed Stock, told Stock that he
was impressed with his qualifications, and began arranging for a
physical examination for Stock. When Dennis Cassidy, the Assistant
Plant Manager, discovered that Miller had violated the company's
affirmative action requirements by interviewing an applicant for a
position before it was publicly advertised, he told Miller to advertise
the position and interview other candidates as well. 137 Stock was in-
formed of this need to advertise and interview more candidates. After
advertisements were listed, it came to light that none of the initial in-
terviewees were minority group members. Because Cassidy sus-
pected that the absence of minority interviewees was not because of a
lack of qualified minority applicants but because Miller was preju-
diced and weeded out applicants who appeared on paper to be mi-
norities, he urged Miller to find qualified minority applicants and to
call them in for interviews. At no time did Cassidy tell Miller that he
must hire a minority.
138
Eventually, Tyrone Anderson, a black male, was interviewed and
subsequently hired for the maintenance mechanic position at Univer-
sal. Anderson had an excellent recommendation from his former em-
ployer. Even Miller, who admitted his prejudice against minorities,
was impressed by Anderson's qualifications and decided that Univer-
sal should hire him. Additionally, on the job, despite the voiced
135 See Exec. Order No. 11,246,3 C.F.R., 1965 Supp. 167 (1965), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. §
2000e app. at 538-41 (requiring that entities contracting with the federal government "not dis-
criminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin [and that such entities take] affirmative action to ensure that applicants
are employed, and that employees are treated during employment without regard to their race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin"). Id.
136 See Stock, 817 F. Supp. at 1302.
13' See id. at 1303.
138 See id.
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prejudices of his co-workers, 139 Anderson impressed them with his
quality work and amiable personality.140
Stock nevertheless brought a reverse discrimination action
against Universal, alleging that Anderson was unqualified for the po-
sition. In reviewing Stock's claim, both the district court and the
court of appeals simply required that Stock show that he was a mem-
ber of a protected class to satisfy the first prong of the McDonnell
Douglas test. 141 This occurred despite the fact that Universal had a
history of discriminating against minorities, engaged in hiring prac-
tices, such as word-of-mouth hiring, that helped to exclude minorities
from consideration for jobs at Universal, and had an admittedly
prejudiced worker in charge of the hiring process for Anderson's po-
sition. All of these facts demonstrate a tendency by Universal to fa-
vor white applicants over black applicants. As a result, Stock was
able to establish his prima facie case of discrimination, thus shifting
the burden to Universal to articulate its reason for not hiring him.
Fortunately, the district court found that Universal was entitled to
summary judgment on Stock's claim on the ground that Stock could
not show that Universal's reason for not hiring him was a pretext for
discrimination. 142 However, had Stock succeeded in showing that
Universal's asserted reason for not hiring him was a pretext for dis-
crimination, Universal would have been forced to expend many re-
sources in a trial to defend its decision to hire Anderson.
Lastly, in choosing not to apply the background circumstances
test, courts would in essence be embracing the principle of formal
equality over the principle of substantive equality. "Formal equality"
defines equality in terms of procedural symmetry. It requires that
decisions be made without any reference to characteristics such as
race. 143 "Substantive equality" defines equality in terms of distribu-
tive justice. It recognizes substantive differences that cause some
persons to be more privileged or advantaged than others and ac-
knowledges that like treatment may not result in those persons actu-
"9 Id. at 1304 n.6 (citing testimony that prior to Anderson's employment at Universal, the
maintenance shop was all-white, and many of the employees in the shop referred to Blacks as
"niggers").
'4o See id. at 1304.
141 See id. at 1306; see also Stock v. Univ. Foods Corp., No. 93-1448, 1994 WL 10682, at
* 2 (4th Cir. Jan. 19, 1994).
142 See id. at 1308-09.
141 See John A. Powell, Worlds Apart: Reconciling Freedom of Speech and Equality, 85
KY. LJ. 9,50-55 (1997); see also Patricia A. Cain, Feminism and the Limits of Equality, 24 GA.
L. REV. 803, 818-19 (1990).
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ally coming out equal in the end.144 In the McDonnell Douglas con-
text, the application of the same test factors to groups that are sub-
stantively unequal in terms of status and access to opportunity would
result in a number of harmful effects. First, it would contradict and
diminish the ideals and spirit of Title VII. As shown in Section I, Ti-
tle VII was not enacted merely to enforce like treatment of all indi-
viduals but was instead enacted primarily as a means of improving the
economic status of Blacks and other minorities. 145  As Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence has shown, the like treatment of all indi-
viduals does little to change the subordination of minorities because it
fails to recognize which groups are and have been traditionally pow-
erful or powerless in society.146 Second, such application would send
a painful message to Blacks, who have often relied on courts to en-
force their rights to equal opportunity, that courts do not recognize or
understand the pervasiveness and the seriousness of current discrimi-
nation. It would also send an implicit message to Whites, whose
privilege allows them to ignore the manner in which racism functions
in society, 147 that discrimination against Blacks and other minorities is
no longer a problem.
Some authors, however, have asserted arguments against apply-
ing a different first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test to white
plaintiffs in reverse discrimination cases. 4 8 These critics of the back-
ground circumstances test argue that a different first prong should not
144 Lucinda M. Finley, Transcending Equality Theory: A Way Out of the Maternity and the
Workplace Debate, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1144 (1986); see also Friedman, supra note 34, at
48-51 (describing substantive equality as concerned with outcome rather than process).
145 See supra Part I.A.
14 See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971). The Supreme Court helped to maintain
societal, racial hierarchy by applying the principle of formal equality to a legal challenge by
Blacks to a city's segregated swimming pool. In that case, the city chose to close the pool rather
than integrate it. The Supreme Court found that the city's action did not violate equality because
Blacks and Whites alike were denied use of the pool. Had the Supreme Court applied the prin-
ciple of substantive equality, as it did in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), it instead would
have chipped away at the badge of inferiority that was placed upon Blacks in the city. See
Palmer, 403 U.S. at 266-67 (White, J., dissenting).
In Loving, the Supreme Court rejected the State of Virginia's argument that its laws
against interracial marriage did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because Blacks and
Whites were treated equally under such laws. See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967).
147 See generally BEVERLY DANIEL TATUM, "WHY ARE ALL THE BLACK KIDS SITTING
TOGETHER IN THE CAFETERIA?" AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS ABOUT RACE, 3-9 (1997) (citing
Peggy McIntosh, Unpacking the Invisible Knapsack: White Privilege, PEACE AND FREEDOM,
July/Aug. 1989, at 10-12); Stephanie M. Wildman & Adrienne D. Davis, Language and Silence:
Making Systems of Privilege Visible, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 881 (1995) (analyzing how
language makes white skin privilege invisible and stressing the importance of addressing privi-
lege as well as oppression).
143 See generally Black, supra note 41 (arguing that courts evaluating reverse discrimina-
tion cases cannot, without violating the spirit of Title VII, implement a different first prong of
the McDonnell Douglas test); Whiteside, supra note 41 (same).
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be applied to white plaintiffs in light of the dissolution of the barriers
which minorities previously faced and the newfound role of affirma-
tive action plans in the employment context. 149 More specifically,
they contend that the use of the "higher" first prong wrongfully as-
sumes that minorities "discriminate with less frequency than non-
minorities.' ' 50 They also maintain that the newfound role of affirma-
tive action plans in employment necessitates the use of the same first
prong for white and black plaintiffs so that white plaintiffs may chal-
lenge the use of race in such programs more easily.
These counterarguments, however, are severely flawed. To be-
gin, the use of the background circumstances test is not based on the
premise that Blacks and other minorities discriminate less than
Whites. All it does is recognize that minorities are not in a position to
or do not have the power to discriminate against non-minorities as
often as non-minorities do.' 51 In fact, courts that apply a different
prong to white plaintiffs have acknowledged the fact that Blacks and
other minorities are equally capable of discriminating against Whites
by allowing white plaintiffs to prove the first prong by demonstrating
that their employer is a minority or that a majority of their supervisors
are minority.1
52
Furthermore, the counterarguments regarding affirmative action
programs are also unwarranted. First, such arguments are circular, as
most affirmative action programs have come into existence only
where an employer has historically discriminated against minorities
or where there is a small minority presence. 153 Second, the mere ex-
istence of affirmative action programs alone does not indicate that
Whites will be invidiously discriminated against because of their race.
Blacks are still significantly underprivileged in the workplace, even in
the federal government, where affirmative action programs have been
the most successful. For example, although Blacks hold a greater
share of white-collar government jobs than Blacks hold in the overall
white-collar labor force, disparities between Blacks and Whites per-
sist in average government grade levels. 154 Minorities still are found
more frequently in clerical and technical government jobs, most of
which top out at grade 9.155 Minority men, except for Asians, remain
stuck in the trainee and developmental levels of professional jobs at
149 See Black, supra note 41, at 350.
15o Id.
151 See supra Part 11.
'52 See supra text accompanying note 21.
153 See ick, supra note 52, at 159-60.
l-4 See Laurent, supra note 4, at 13. The term "grade levels" refers to the federal govern-
ment's system for determining compensation and benefit levels for its employees.
1SS See id.
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grade levels 5, 7, and 9 longer than white men. 156 Furthermore, while
minorities hold 29 percent of all government jobs, they fill just 10
percent of non-political senior level posts.
57
Lastly, by allowing majority members to challenge affirmative
action programs more easily, courts would be allowing white plain-
tiffs to attack some of the very programs which have helped Blacks to
make progress within the field of employment-the primary goal of
Title VII. 158 As the Supreme Court stated in Weber, "[i]t would be
ironic indeed if a law triggered by a Nation's concern over centuries
of racial injustice and intended to improve the lot of those who have
'been excluded from the American dream for so long' constituted the
first legislative prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious
efforts to abolish traditional patterns of racial segregation and hierar-
chy."'159
In sum, in order to ensure fairness, courts must apply a different
first prong of the McDonnell Douglas test to white plaintiffs. Ap-
plying the same standards to Blacks and Whites is only fair if one
presumes that Blacks and Whites are treated equally by employers.
As previous sections have shown, equal treatment does not always
occur. The background circumstances requirement ensures that the
circumstances for both traditional discrimination and reverse dis-
crimination cases brought against white employers are similar.
IV. CONCLUSION
The courts should not apply the same McDonnell Douglas test to
white and black plaintiffs in Title VII race discrimination cases. The
conditions that existed during the creation of both Title VII and the
McDonnell Douglas test still exist to a great extent today. Thus, the
same force that was needed to combat racial discrimination against
minorities in 1964 and 1973 is still necessary for combating such dis-
crimination today. More so, these dismal conditions raise an impor-
tant question as to whether the different standard applied to Whites is
actually different at all. The background circumstances requirement
or the modified first prong "merely substitutes for the minority plain-
tiffs burden to show that he is a member of a racial minority."160
156 See id. at 16.
'7 See id.
1SS See supra Part I.A.
151 443 U.S. 193, 204 (internal citations omitted) (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 2552 (1964)
(statement of Sen. Humphrey); see also supra Section LB.
'60 Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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